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The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons 
that have been learnt through its evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland 
framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future. 

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British 
and Irish governments and the military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security 
Forces. The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non-linear interplay of 
these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension. 

The 1998 Belfast Agreement established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee 

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the framework for peace. These include 
Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical 
enquiries, the difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and implementing 
demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor economic performance are the most significant forces 
today. There has been a persistent rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents’ are determined to 
remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity has brought a rise in 
Republican violence, a potent combination of political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more 
slowly than any other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure and grants. 
Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and development with sustainable growth and prosperity. 

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI-Std Z39-18 


USMC Command and Staff College 
Marine Corps University 
2076 South Street 
Quantico, VA 22134-5068 











3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 
jper September 2011-April 2012 




Master of Military Studies Research F 


The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace: Terrorism and its Aftermath 

Urry, Simon R. 




To combat these forces have been a strong civic society and 

The Northern Ireiand peace process wiii become ever reiiant 
morai authority, to keep on its path to peace. In order to ove 
provide a stabie and secure future, the Northern Ireiand Assi 
in the Beifast Agreement and address the criticai security an^ 
seeks a secure and stabie future. 

their eventuai distaste for terrorism, vioience and hatred. 

on the strong civii society of Northern Ireiand, and their 
rcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and 
jmbiy must overcome the weakness in governance inherent 
t economic chaiienges. A reformed Northern Ireiand stiii 


Northern Ireiand; Peace Process; Terrorism; Insurgei 
Decommissioning; British Army; Dissident Repubiicans; PIR/ 

icy; Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Reconciliation; 
V; Loyalists; 


ABSTRACT OF F AGES Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College 

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STANDARD FORM 298 Back (Rev. 8/98) 

Table of Contents 




























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During my military career I have spent more of my military eareer in Northern Ireland 
than anywhere else. I have covered the range and seope of military operations, from 
Conventional Patrolling in the eounty of South Armagh, to Speeial Surveillanee and 
Reeonnaissanee aeross the Provinee of Northern Ireland, and served in every offieer rank 

up to and ineluding Major. 

I have found Ireland intriguing. Its history, identity and eharm have influeneed me and 
played a formative role in my military leadership experiences and operational serviee. I 
have focused my researeh on the future trends rather than the past because Northern 
Ireland will faee greater difficulty in the future than it has since the Belfast Agreement of 


It is said that no prudent Englishman should write about Irish affairs. I chose this topic as 
I have partieipated and read about actions there without fully understanding or 
appreeiating aetions and signifioanee. My operational serviee in Northern Ireland has 
shaped my professional development and developed my approaeh to military leadership. 
The issue of Northern Ireland remains at the forefront of the British domestie polities. 
The National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) gives Northern Ireland priority. I hope that 
by analyzing the future rather than past, this paper ean add value to future military 
professionals about to embark on operations either in Northern Ireland or in a similar 

eonfliot elsewhere. 

This is a eontemporary topie that is eonstantly evolving. This factual and 
analytical interpretation is aeeurate as at April 2012. 


Executive Summary 

Title: The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace: Terrorism and its Aftermath. 

Author: Major Simon Urry MBE Royal Marines. 

Thesis: The Northern Ireland peace process today is not a stable and secure framework 
for peace in the future. 

Discussion: The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the 
framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its 
evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland 
framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future. 

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the 
nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the military, 
including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security Forces. The 
most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non¬ 
linear interplay of these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist 
nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension. The 1998 Belfast Agreement 
established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee 

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the 
framework for peace. These include Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the 
division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical enquiries, the 
difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and 
implementing demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor 
economic performance are the most significant forces today. There has been a persistent 
rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents’ are determined to 
remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and 
terrorist activity has brought a rise in Republican violence, a potent combination of 
political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more slowly than any 
other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure 
and grants. Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and 
development with sustainable growth and prosperity. To combat these forces have been a 
strong civic society and their eventual distaste for terrorism, violence and hatred. 

Conclusion: The Northern Ireland peace process will become ever reliant on the strong 
civil society of Northern Ireland, and their moral authority, to keep on its path to peace. 

In order to overcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a 
stable and secure future, the Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in 
governance inherent in the Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and 
economic challenges. A reformed Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future. 


The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem begins with the number of actors 
involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the 
military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security 
Forces.' The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the 
complex and non-linear interplay of these actors. The 1998 Belfast Agreement 
established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests. The Northern Ireland 
framework for peace today is not yet stable and secure for the future due to a number of 
violent and non-violent forces, but principally security and economic influences. 

For security, there has been a rise in dissident Republican violence, terrorism and 
ambition since 2007. The dissidents’ use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity 
provides both a potent mix for support and capability for the organization. There is 
significant economic instability. Northern Ireland has the lowest economic activity in the 
United Kingdom (UK), a high dependence on public expenditure and grants, and a 6.9% 
reduction in funding over the next four years from the government’s coalition spending. 
Finally, within the Northern Irish society, mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist 
nationalisms have not yet found an ability to forge a common British-Irish identity. 

This paper does not attempt to provide a detailed history of the Troubles, as the 
conflict since 1969 became euphemistically known; nor is it an account of the policies of 
successive British governments towards Northern Ireland; still less is it a definitive 
record of the operations of the security forces and their battle of attrition and 
containment. Rather, the focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of 
the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its 
evolution and recommendations for Northern Ireland or a similar conflict elsewhere. 


Overview of the Troubles 

It is important to understand the baekground and eauses of the eonfliet, so that 
their implieations for the present and the future framework for peaee ean be realized. 
Although Ireland had fallen under English influenee from the 12* eentury Norman 
invasion, it has only been offieially part of the United Kingdom sinee the Aet of Union in 
1801. The IRA’s Easter Rising of 1916 was a turning point in Irish history that led to the 
Anglo-Irish War of 1919 to 1921. The eontinued British repression of Republiean 
politieal expression led to widespread support aeross Ireland for the Irish rebels. The 
1920 Government of Ireland Aet partitioned Ireland and established a separate Northern 
Ireland that ineluded only six eounties rather than the aneient nine-eounty Provinee of 
Ulster. This was to guarantee a Protestant majority in the north. The provineial 
government of the eonservative Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) then eontrolled Northern 
Ireland for the next fifty years. It employed its own dominanee of orangeism^ to bind 
together an uneasy elass allianee of Unionist eontrol and authority. 

In the late 1960s a eonglomerate of Catholies, nationalists, Republieans and 
agnostie soeialists, along with a handful of Protestants, opposed to Unionist dominanee, 


diserimination, and their soeial marginalization, founded the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Assoeiation (NICRA). It was designed to “bring Northern Ireland effeetive 
demoeraey, and to end all of the forms of injustiee, intimidation, diserimination and 
deprivation, whieh result from the partisan rule of the Stormont regime.”"^ Although 
many pereeived this as a peaeeful eivil rights protest movement, the minority intended to 
spark eivil unrest and anarehy, using dangerously eonfrontational taeties to draw attention 


to their cause. ^ This catalyst of NICRA protest marches mobilized a huge swell of 
Catholic and minority support to redistribute civil rights evenly amongst the Protestant 
and Catholic communities. Association with the growing militancy of the Republican 
movement tainted NICRA, as the Stormont government saw NICRA as a direct threat to 
its own authority and the start of a Republican plot.^ When the nationalists marched 
through predominantly Unionist residential areas, it sparked a counter movement by the 
Protestants and evoked heavy-handed responses by militant Loyalists, elements of the 
RUC, and the auxiliary Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, or ‘B’ Specials).’ Northern 
Ireland spiraled into sectarian clashes, militancy, vigilante groups, and civil disorder. It 
fed a vicious cycle. The turning point of the Troubles was in August 1969, when 
nationalists targeted the Orangemen march in Londonderry. The RUC were incapable of 
controlling unrest across Londonderry and Belfast and on 14 August 1969, the Home 
Secretary James Callaghan answered a request from his counterpart in the Northern 
Ireland government at Stormont to call in the British Army for help. 1969 started the 
period of the Troubles. Twenty-nine years later, the 1998 Belfast Agreement initiated the 
start of the peace process. The destabilizing influences on the framework for peace today 
have historical significance (see Appendix A, B, D & E). 

Defining the Problem. In order to establish a framework for peace in 1998, the 
Northern Ireland problem was a complex of social, ethnic, and nationalist issues played 
out by many actors who represented the diversity of Northern Ireland (see Appendix B). 
One may speak of three main protagonists: the people, the government, and the military. 

- The People. Within its borders were the majority Protestant Unionist 
communities, who intended to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and 


resisted the pereeived threat of a united Ireland. The minority Catholie nationalist 
eommunities either pereeived the issue as a nationalist struggle for self-determination or a 
problem of eorruption or unfair praetiees by sueeessive Unionist governments. Both 
eommunities have had to withstand the indiseriminate eharaeter of violenee, polities and 
allegianees, demographie segregation of Protestants and Catholies within eommunities, 
and soeio-eeonomie inequality, entrenehed from bitterness and hatred that polarized both 
eommunities (see Appendix D). The stoie people of Northern Ireland have always 
provided moral authority throughout the Troubles. Communities have identified what 
they pereeived as just and fair, resisted marginalization, foreed aoeommodation and 
ehange that eommunity and politieal leaders found diffieult to overeome. Religion and 
demographies have not been sourees of the eonfiiet rather they have reinforeed, and at 
times aeted as a eatalyst, to the violenee between the eommunities. 

- The Government, The internal infiuenee was the British Government, with no 
strategie, selfish, or eeonomie interest in Northern Ireland but instead eommitted to 
support and proteet its people as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The external 
infiuenee was the Dublin Government, whieh had pledged to take over Northern Ireland 
and form a united island (see Appendix E & F). Both governments sought a reasoned 
end through negotiation and politieal settlement rather than violenee or ehanee. 

- The Military, The military is split between the paramilitaries and the seeurity 
forees. For the paramilitaries, the Irish Republiean Army (IRA) represented the 
mainstream Republiean movement, and used politieal violenee against the state both 
internally and externally (see Appendix I). Proteeting the Unionist eommunities were the 
Foyalist paramilitaries, the defenders of their Protestant Ulster (see Appendix J). Caught 


between the violenee and hatred of the eommunities were the seeurity forces: the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the locally recruited Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR, later 
the Royal Irish Regiment Home Service Force), and the British Army whose role was to 
provide military assistance to the civil power (see Appendix K). 

- The Trinity. The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem can be described 
using the Clausewitz Trinity and his concept of war as an analytical framework and a 


basis for study. He used “war is more than a true chameleon” as his metaphor that 
explained unlimited variations in conflict, shaped by contextual specifics where the cause 
and course of war cannot be planned or controlled. The character of the Northern Irish 
conflict changed constantly due to the ever-changing human dynamics of personalities, 
public will, and public perception. The Troubles ably demonstrated the three components 
of the Clausewitz “remarkable trinity.”^ First, pulling and pushing the central underlying 
forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity were the polarizing nationalisms of 
Irish Republicans and Ulster Unionists (irrational forces). Secondly, the play of chance 
and probability were reflected by the sectarian and political violence of paramilitaries and 
the actions of the security forces (non-rational forces).Thirdly, was the rational 
purpose and policy of two governments and the international dimension (rational forces), 
influenced by circumstance and time that attempted to determine the locus of the crisis 
between a “political or operational center of gravity.”'' 

Overview of the framework for peace 

The framework for peace was the beginning of the management of negotiations 
without conflict, through supporting effects of political, security, economic, and 
social/perceptual lines of development (Appendix A). The peace process has been the 


coordination of this framework, to ensure all the lines of development and decisive 
eonditions have been met. The Belfast Agreement in 1998 brought the eonfliet to the 
negotiating table, and started the peace proeess. It was faeilitated through settled politieal 
institutions, whieh enjoyed popular legitimaey always previously denied, a “transition of 
unsustainable approaches to more sustainable ones.” Unionists and nationalists then 
realized that they had to make the neeessary eompromises to reaeh an agreement. 

The Belfast Agreement was a sueeess eompared to other agreements, as it 
developed different approaehes to the business of making peaee, new struetures, and 
proeesses of interaetion. Firstly, the Agreement had joint eustody from the British and 
Irish governments and included the parties aetively involved in the eonfliet (inelusion 
rather than exelusion of politieal parties with paramilitary assoeiations [see page 7]). 
Seeondly a politieal and eonstitutional framework was agreed but with a detailed and 
eomprehensive implementation proeess to meet deeisive eonditions aeross eaeh line of 
development. The agreement involved a sophistieated devolution package, with 
signifieant power resting with an inelusive power-sharing assembly of Northern Ireland’s 
elected representatives. Northern Ireland’s eonstitutional position within the United 
Kingdom was re-affirmed, the eonstitution of the Irish Republie was amended to remove 
its territorial elaim on Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland’s future constitutional 
position was linked to the eonsent of the people. A British and Irish Council, and a 
North-South Ministerial Couneil would enable eo-operation between the British and Irish 
governments. The durability of the Belfast Agreement was its strong popular support 
(71% support from the electors), underpinned by a strong civil society in Northern 
Ireland. From the negotiations perspeetive, positional bargaining of the parties was 


replaced by principled negotiation using an all-purpose strategy, dealing directly with the 
interests of the people rather than party positions. 

The framework for peace identified many decisive points and conditions on 
political, security, economic, and social lines of operation to be met along the way. 
Appendix A is not intended to be comprehensive, but an overview of the framework for 
peace with the key inputs, influences, and the so what. For example on the security line 
of development, the most contention has concerned the declared decommissioning of 
IRA weapons in 2005; this allowed the statements from Loyalist paramilitaries 
committed to end their terror campaigns. Other decisive points that followed were the 
normalization of security and the termination of the British Army Operation BANNER in 
July 2007.^^ What followed have been the devolution of the power-sharing institutions 
by the British government to the local Stormont Assembly in May 2007, and the final 
hurdle of the devolution of Policing and Justice in April 2010. 

Assessment of the framework for peace 

The stability and security of any emerging peace process depends on the 
interaction between a range of violent and non-violent forces, challenges and influences 
that are both historic and current. Although there are too many for this paper to 
summarize succinctly, the following are the immediate and most significant that have 
affected the stability and security of the Northern Ireland peace process. The assessment 
starts with areas that have generally worked well for the framework for peace, followed 
by areas that have not worked so well, finishing with what has failed to be addressed. 

Political Inclusion, Messaging and Reconciliation - A core component of the 


peace process was inclusion or as Ramsbotham describes, “Clausewitz in reverse,” 


although it was never a straightforward battle between prineiple (exelusion) and 
pragmatism (inelusion). The big unknown of integrating Republieans and Loyalists 

into eonstitutional polities eould either have intensified ethnie resentment (a eontinuation 
of efforts to destabilize) or helped to eontain it (poaehers beeoming gamekeepers). The 
ability of aeeomplished former paramilitaries to hold polhieal office has proven that 
inclusion has helped to contain mainstream Republican and Loyalist resentment within 
the framework for peace. However sincere these leading figures may be portrayed, they 
have discredited acts of political violence they used to command. Their influence and 
open messaging to a disaffected youth has made a difference. It has been a compromise 
but a necessary condition to secure the framework for peace. Reconciliation has been the 
reconfiguration of relationships and acceptability between the military (paramilitaries and 
security forces) and society, removing any sense of threat. Although many mainstream 
Republicans are better off for this (e.g. Martin McGuinness), there is still a risk of 
Republican destabilization and inflammation of the dissident cause. 

A Strong Civic Society Distaste for Terrorism - The biggest single group 
affected by the Troubles was the local population, segregated by ethnic affiliation and 
determined political allegiances. The loyalist strikes in 1974 portrayed a civil society that 
was sectarian, uncompromising, and negative. Public perception and influence had 
shifted almost full circle by 1998 into a strategically focused and effective civil force for 
peace. This was an important factor. The church, the media, and the business 
community strongly supported the Belfast Agreement, almost breaking ranks with 
political orthodoxy. By 1998, the Northern Irish society had had enough of the Troubles, 


the violence and hatred of the past. Their fatigue translated into power of the popular 
support for a singular direction. 

The Political Principle of Consent - The route to the Belfast Agreement in the 
1990’s saw the elevation of the principle of consent into a relevant political mechanism to 
decide Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. The decision by the British and Irish 
governments to put the agreement to the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum 
formed a cornerstone to the Agreement. Northern Ireland’s constitutional status would 
only change if the people of Northern Ireland voted for it. The democratic validation 
expanded the peace process to then encompass political parties, civil society, and even 
paramilitary groups. It also provided moral authority that opponents found difficult to 
counter into the process. 

The Influence of Key Personalities/Leaders - The peace process involved 
concessions to end the violence of paramilitaries in return for their entry into negotiations 
and the broader deal for their constituents. In Northern Ireland there were key 
personalities and leaders that influenced the process in both a stable and destabilizing 
way, but ultimately their actions led to final devolution of power to Stormont in 2007. 
There were four larger-than-life personalities who were the Troubles’ ‘four musketeers’: 
David Trimble and Ian Paisley from the unionist side, and from the nationalist side Gerry 
Adams and John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) 
from 1979 to 2001 and co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, with David Trimble. 
The musketeers role and responsibility is just as important today, in whatever public 
position or role they hold, to influence either radicals or conservatives, politicians and 
leaders, to ensure the framework for peace they fought for stays on track. 


John Hume is analyzed briefly as he was the influential nationalist figure to 
unloek the Republiean strategy of politieal violenee. He alone realized that there was 
more to just the pereeived anti-English mantra of “eight eenturies of English subjugation 
of Ireland” and long favored a peaeemaking model. He embarked on a dialogue with 
Sinn Eein/IRA (the Hume-Adams dialogue) to rethink Sinn Eein’s entrenehed views on 
the role of the British Government and the position of the unionist eommunity in Ireland, 
and find a united and politieal way out of the eonfliet. He brought together the 
nationalist eonsensus by linking Sinn Eein, the Soeial Demoeratie and Eabor Party 
(SDEP), Irish Government, and Irish Ameriean supporters. He was also instrumental in 
establishing the north/south institutions set out in the ‘Erameworks for the Euture’, an 
aeknowledgement of the SDEP elaim that there eould be no exelusively internal solution 
to the Northern Ireland problem. Prom a nationalist perspeetive, his influenee as an old 
hand eannot be understated, more so than Gerry Adams or Martin MeGuinness. 

The International Dimension - A range of international initiatives were tried and 
tested; some met with suceess, and others failed eompletely. The British Government’s 
initial desire to keep the Troubles within its domestie orbit and out of the international 
agenda at the start bloeked third-party mediators. The mispereeption was that the British 
Government thought it eould fulfill this role from the start. Then the appointment of US 
Senator George Mitehell as ehairman of the international body on arms deeommissioning 


beeame an integral eomponent of the British and Irish government’s twin-traek proeess. 
Mitehell then stayed on to ehair the all-party talks that evolved and led up to the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998. Also influential was President Bill Clinton visiting Northern Ireland 
three times in his Presideney, three visits more than any other serving President. Por 


Clinton, Northern Ireland would be a low-eost, low-risk foreign policy endeavor, pushing 


at a door half-open. He encouraged US companies to invest and included the 


Republicans, encouraging them to leave violence behind. 

The international dimension was supportive, strategic, and occasional rather than 
the dominant force in setting the conditions for the framework for peace. The use of 
independent mediators and international statesman with the trust and respect from all the 
opposing sides, and the public’s ability to identify with them, was the success, rather than 
using an international body influenced by broader agendas. This is why the US influence 
was so critical compared to others. The instability of the framework for peace since 
1998 has not yet reached the level of influence or interest for international mediation. 

Secret Talks and Ceasefires - Secret talks between representatives of the main 
warring factions, in this particular case the IRA and the British Government, can often 
facilitate the start of open political dialogue. For Northern Ireland, it involved taking 
political risks, overcoming rival intelligence battles, and influencing protagonists to 
provide a conduit to start negotiations. The Northern Ireland conflict proved the value 
of secret talks and ceasefires. Before the 1994 ceasefires, the talks brought agreement in 
principle on a number of sensitive issues of compromise, such as the early release of 
prisoners and the public inclusion of Sinn Fein to negotiations, which had not been done 

Terrorist Disengagement and De-Radicalization to enable Negotiations - The 

Northern Ireland peace process required an ingenious approach to the tricky problem of 
how to disengage and de-radicalize a terrorist movement while also negotiating with ex¬ 
militants. The Mitchell Principles (see Appendix G) set conditions for entry to talks. 


enforced them, and succeeded in imposing unwelcome norms during the critical 
negotiations period, that Sinn Fein in particular were unused to. In late February 1998 
after the use of Republican vigilante violence by the IRA, Sinn Fein was expelled, and 
not allowed to take part in the negotiations for two weeks. It was at considerable cost in 
terms of party distraction and lost negotiating time.^"^ 

Military Lessons - Initially the Army had not set out a clear campaign plan or 
strategy. The British contemporary doctrine at the time Counter Revolutionary Warfare 
was based upon the jungle, rural operations, and colonial territories. As a result the 
troops expected some kind of internal security situation of Cyprus, Aden, or British 
Guiana. The military had to learn and adapt to a campaign that contained elements of a 
classical and modern insurgency, coupled with the integration of the population and high 
profile information operations. The key lessons learnt were a need for an over arching 
campaign authority, understanding the root causes of the violence, and realistic 
expectations about the length of time needed to resolve the situation (the long war). 

Other lessons included the value of a dedicated operational training team system; a policy 
of preventing violence in the first instance; developing first rate intelligence structures, 
processes, and capabilities; and finally to fully appreciate how covert offensive action by 
special operations or intelligence organizations would play out in the political arena and 

-5 0 

other spheres. These lessons have been valuable to ensure a secure framework for the 
future; unfortunately demilitarization and organizational change of security structures has 
led to a requirement for these lessons to be relearnt. 


The key areas that have lead to the instability and inseeurity for the framework for 
peace are political, security, social, and the most recent area, economics. 

Strategic Understanding - The British Government and Army failed to 
understand, let alone influence, Irish policy and planning leading up to 1969 and served 


at times to reinforce the polarizing effect that has made the Troubles so enduring. 
Understanding and knowledge of the problem improved but as John Belloch, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1988, stated: “neither a London nor a Belfast (let 
alone a Dublin) picture was complete in itself Ministers, officials, others of our 
governing community were all at risk of losing the essential binocular vision of the 
Northern Ireland situation, without constant and conscious self-awareness of it.”"^° This 
lack of strategic understanding of the character of the Troubles is unfortunately still seen 
today within the British and Irish governments, leading to a lack of strategic insight 
towards planning for a secure and stable framework for peace in the future. Political 
leadership from within Northern Ireland is also part of the problem. The First Minister 
Peter Robinson said in his Christmas 2011 message that “he is determined to do all he 
can to build upon peace and stability in Northern Ireland in 2012.” We still await his 
leadership and strategic direction as to how he will achieve this, for it is lacking. 

The division of the unionist movement - the Unionist movement has been 
obliged to move towards a new pluralist politics, embracing new economic and political 
relationships with an Irish Republic.This has weakened the link between Unionist 
politics and its cultural and religious heritage of Protestant-Britishness. There remains 

disunity over the best means of retaining their constitutional link to Great Britain. 


Security - Dissident Republicans - Contrary to British Security Service 
assessment in 2007 that the residual threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland was likely 
to decline, there has been a persistent and significant rise in terrorist activity and ambition 
in Northern Ireland over the last three years; the terrorist threat level in Northern Ireland 
is graded SEVERE"^^ (see Appendix H). Dissident Republican groups, significantly the 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
have not supported the peace process and remain active. Recently other dissident groups 
have joined the mix including Republican Action Against Drugs, Eirigi, Republican 
Network for Unity, and most notably the growing threat of Oghlaigh Na h’Eireann 
(OnH). Dissidents purport to reject any political agreement that falls short of a British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the establishment of an independent and united 
Ireland, reflecting the capacity of a tradition to endure. Their ideological Totalitarian 
Republicanism holds sympathy with the nationalist population. Despite their number of 
approximately six hundred, with RIRA posing as the largest membership, they do have a 
mobilization potential within the nationalist community. The threat to GB remains. In 
May 2011, a number of coded warnings were received which suggested a bomb had been 
left in Central Eondon. Although it was a hoax, these were the first coded warnings 
related to GB from Northern Ireland terrorist groups for ten years. 

Britain’s National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) identified as a priority risk/ Tier 
One “international terrorism affecting the UK or its interests; and/or a significant increase 
in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland;” the strategy further states that “the 
security situation is unlikely to improve in the short term.”"^"^ The threat of Irish terrorism 
and the risk to the peace process was also recognized as a Tier One risk in the National 


Security Risk Assessment.'^^ The Strategic Defense and Security Review 2010 (SDSR) 
stated “the ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will 
contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great 
Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to Substantial, meaning 
that an attack is a strong possibility.”"^^ Although UK arrest and prosecution data 
provides only a partial picture of the terrorist threat, the number of arrests in connection 
with terrorist related activity in Northern Ireland in 2010 was 98% higher than in 2009 
(see Appendix As a result of NI terrorism threat and risk analysis, in February 
2011, an additional £245 million was provided to help cope with the dissident threat: 


£199.5 million from the Treasury and £45 million from the NI Executive. 

The dissident Republicans (DRs) are determined to try to destabilize the Northern 
Ireland Executive (NIE) and continue to target the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) in particular; they also aspire to mount attacks in Great Britain.Once 
coordinated and cooperative, they have proved to be dangerous and resilient. Recently 
there have been different attack techniques, improved weapons capability, all have been 
Northern Ireland focused (especially under-vehicle IEDs).^° There is little evidence of 
any political initiative on the part of the dissident Republican splinter groups, and even if 
they were in a position to articulate their strategy publicly, it is unlikely that the message 
would be coherent. Their political base is small and localized, as evidenced in the 
2010 Economic and Social Research Council Election Survey. The dissident makeup 
and support network bring a completely different security dilemma for the British and 
Irish security forces. The concern is that these are the ‘clean skins’ or unknowns, 
recruited from a new generation of Republican extremists. They are uniting a network 


of radicals dissatisfied with the route of mainstream Republicanism, and utilizing the 
power vaeuum in disaffeeted eommunities left by the poliee and PIRA.^"^ They view 
publie support as useful but not essential, a key distinction between eriminal and politieal 
insurgents. They laek the politieal ideology and operational eapaeity of the Provisional 
IRA; instead it is limited to the romanticized violent Republican tradition. The use of 
their eriminal enterprises in the day, with involvement in both smuggling and the illegal 
nareoties market, and their terrorist aetivity in the evening, has brought a rise in 
Republiean violenee mixed with eriminality. This is a potent eombination of politieal 
signifieance, but it is also an opportunity for a eounter terrorist strategy to target 
dissidents for more eommon forms of eriminality.^^ This disruption of the networks for 
vulnerabilities in lifestyles could bring local support back to the community policing, an 
area onee the domain of the Provisional IRA. As illustrated in Appendix H, there are 
worrying trends, but to maintain some perspeetive from the Troubles, even in the last two 
years, the total number of ineidents attributed to dissident Republieans in any one year is 
less than that reeorded in two days at the height of the Troubles in the early 1970s. The 
dissidents are not at the seale of the Provisional IRA at their zenith, but a destabilizing 
influenee on the framework for peaee for the future nonetheless. 

Reforming the Police Service - the politieal reform required of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) to meet the milestones set out in the Independent Commission on 
Polieing for Northern Ireland in 1998 (Patten Commission), has left its conventional 
polieing within the PSNI unprepared to eope with the demands of eounter-terrorism and 
serious and organized erime. The rush to readdress the demographie imbalanees of a 
majority Protestant poliee foree to reeruiting more Catholie volunteers has ereated a 


significant gap in counter-terrorist experienee.^^ This is most telling at the loeal polieing 
level. These ehanges, eoupled with the demilitarization from the Army have led to a far 
weaker seeurity apparatus to stop a growing national seeurity threat and priority for 
polieing. Although the PSNI had an extremely eapable eounter-terrorist organization, it 
is now ageing and it needs to reeruit seeurity eonseious operators, whieh it is no longer 
finding. Eleven years on, the PSNI has now elaimed it has had to rehire former offieers 
on temporary eontraets beeause “they have the skills and eritieal experienee it needs to 
investigate erimes and eombat terrorism.” Nearly half of them are employed in the 

most sensitive areas of polieing, ineluding intelligenee.^^ This is indieative of the soeial 
and personnel ehallenges the PSNI faee for the future rather than a struetural problem to 
the framework for peaee itself. 

Demilitarization (Normalization)/ Decommissioning - This proved to be one of 

the main stumbling bloeks for the framework for peaee after 1998. The paee of 
demilitarization of the seeurity forees, to inelude foree struetures, eapabilities, estate, 
fiseal, and the transfer of tasks to the PSNI and Seeurity Serviees under the Op BANNER 
normalization direetives, did not mateh the pereeived paee of deeommissioning of the 
paramilitary eapability. The Belfast Agreement laeked a graduated program of 
deeommissioning synehronized with any seeurity foree or state demilitarization. A 
synehronized program eould have prevented the time eonsuming dispute over IRA 
deeommissioning that eventually ineluded an announeement by the IRA, on the 26* 
September 2005: “the IRA leadership ean now eonfirm that the proeess of putting our 
arms verifiably beyond use has been eompleted.”*’*’ Despite promises, trust, and 
eonfidenee there are still unanswered questions for the publie sueh as, “what pereentage 


of arms have actually been destroyed” and “how do we know remnants are beyond use?” 
There remains too much ambiguity on whether this decisive condition has been achieved 
or merely appeased for political and perception reasons. 

Dealing with the past - Enquiries have been an adjunct to the peace process, 
including the Office of the Police Ombudsman and Historical Enquiries Team (HET) 
reviewing historic crimes and incidents where evidence is unclear or conflicting. 

Eegally, morally, and politically of help on the road to peace, they have been part of a 
process of appeasement to the communities that something is being done to heal the rift 
of alleged collusion, corruption, and public accountability. In June 2010, David Cameron 
announced in the House of Commons the results of the Eord Saville Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry as “unjustified and unjustifiable.” This was matched by jubilation by the 
nationalist community in Londonderry.^' At a cost of £195 million, the British 


Government stated, “there will never be such an open-ended and costly inquiry again.” 

Economics - the economic development and financial self-sufficiency of 
Northern Ireland was not comprehensively addressed as part of the Belfast Agreement. 
Today, the economic crisis and downturn has exposed the vulnerability of Northern 
Ireland. It has the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United Kingdom, and 
the rate of unemployment has increased in four years from 3.8% in 2007 to 19.1% in 
2011.^"' The Index of Production (lOP) for Northern Ireland from the Department of 
Einance and Personnel has shown a steady decline in Northern Ireland’s production 
sector industries in real terms. The Northern Ireland index remains some 18.9% below 
the peak recorded in the boom of Quarter 4, 2007. In the same period the UK fell by 
10.6% over the same period.PricewaterhouseCoopers projects 2012 growth of 1.0% 


for the UK economy and just 0.6% for Northern Ireland.^^ As the Chief of Defense Staff 
announced, “the single biggest strategic risk facing the UK today is economic rather than 
military.... a thriving economy must be central to any Grand Strategy.” The extent and 

quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival has depended on five main factors: direct 


grants, increased investment, the tourism and retail sectors, the fair employment issue, 
and the security factor. The factor carrying the most risk today is that of direct grants 
coupled with the destabilization of the economic downturn. 

In 1977 Northern Ireland was designated as a priority objective European Union 
(EU) region on the basis of its peripheral position and disadvantaged status. The EU has 
been the largest supporter of peace building through Peace Eunds. The current grant, 
the last of three, runs out in 2013. At the time of the last European elections, in 2009, it 
was generally assumed that PEACE III, worth 333 million euros, would be the last 
special hand out Northern Ireland and the Irish border counties would get from 
Brussels.There is not yet any new British Government support to the EU for Peace 
Eund IV. The risk is that this could become embroiled in the wider EU budget 
negotiations dragging up to 2013, when Peace III runs out, coupled with wider British 


Government financial austerity measures. 

The UK Exchequer has been the largest contributor with an annual subvention, 
new government grants, and tax relief and peace bonuses. As a result of the economic 
downturn Northern Ireland is no longer insulated by public spending largesse, budget 
cuts driven by the British Government’s coalition spending review have reduced funding 
from central government to Northern Ireland by 6.9% over the next four years. In 2010, 


Northern Ireland enjoyed publie spending per head 25% above the UK average, with a 
third of the employed workforee in the publie seetor. 

The final eeonomie twist eomes from the southern Irish National Asset 
Management Ageney (Nama), whieh bought out the toxie debt left in Irish banks after the 
property crash at the end of 2007.^"^ Nama now controls over £3.35 billion worth of debt 
in properties and businesses in Northern Ireland and is now ready to raise funds for the 
southern Irish taxpayer who ended up funding the project, by selling its assets in the 
north. So after all of the Troubles, the southern Irish taxpayer is effectively setting the 
level of the Northern Ireland property market. 

The assumption is that all of this is manageable. Northern Ireland is a small 
region within a rich nation-state, but the strength of the economic union has now become 
a source of instability (see recommendations).^^ The threat is that the Northern Irish 
business community has not seen a consistent “reduction of uncertainty, as it depends on 
the prospect of stability.” The extent and quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival 
is still very much dependent on its five main factors. The Northern Ireland Executive 
economic strategy, and the latest economic commentary by the department on 30* 
January 2012, fails to convince the public that there is a path for sustainable growth and 
prosperity for 2012 and beyond. Instead the strategy focuses on a path of “Rebalancing 
and Rebuilding to improve the economic competitiveness of the Northern Ireland 
economy.The strategy lacks any detail, progress and is not an economic path at all.^° 

Recommendations for the future 

Political party and ethnic bloc rivalries still dominate the political agenda, at the 
expense of a sense of collective responsibility to the interests of the Northern Irish 


people. The parallel trajeetories of the DUP and Sinn Fein have left them defined less by 
their eonstitutional preferenees, and more by their politieal messaging and soeio-ethnie 
influence, publicly opposing new violence. The provisions of the Belfast Agreement 
must be overtaken by a more open and accommodating political structure. This structure 
requires institutions of government to effectively deliver the range of public policy 
outcomes desired by the great majority of the people, irrespective of background or 
affinitive ideology. The coalition of nationalists and unionists to rule together (as First 
and Deputy First Minister) still negates any effective political opposition or oversight. 
Northern Ireland politic needs stronger governance and leadership to promote a 
comprehensive response to the critical challenges ahead. 

For security the PSNI needs to be more rigorously trained in counter-terrorism to 
compensate for the lack of practical experience at the local level. The Security Policy 
Meetings (SPM) must continue to place counter-terrorism work as a high priority as 
part of policing. Key counter-terrorist capabilities should be maintained, along with 
enhancement of counter-terrorist capabilities in areas with significant intelligence 
collection gaps. A counter-dissident Republican strategy ought to take into account the 
constantly changing social and political circumstances within its community and criminal 
policing, specifically within Republicanism. Success should not be measured in terms of 
arrests, but prosecutions in the courts (only 21% for Northern Ireland). The Public 
Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland should reassess its criminal conviction and 
procedure in line with the recommendations set out in the Justice and Security Green 
Paper (October 2011). This recommendation is worthy of further study as any 
terrorism case can fall at the charge, decision to prosecute, or committal and trial, due to 


a lack of robust protection for safeguarding the disclosure of relevant sensitive material 
and eolleetion teehniques. 

The Northern Ireland Exeeutive requires an improved eeonomie strategy that 
promotes private investment, growth, and a higher proportion of self-funding. There 
ought to be less self-relianee on publie expenditure and grants and greater symbiosis of 
eeonomie and soeial development. Seeuring a lower eorporation tax should be a top 
priority to make the most of the Exeeutive’s planned eapital expenditure plan. This will 
boost eonfidenee in the business area. Einally Northern Ireland should diversify its 
export base to avoid over-relianee on a small number of markets and to take advantage of 
opportunities in the faster growing emerging eeonomies. 

There has been little soeial reintegration and reeoneiliation for members of 
paramilitary organizations transitioning to normal soeiety in Northern Ireland, espeeially 
aeross the seetarian divide. Sueeessful proseeution does not eliminate risk, as terrorists 
ean eontinue to pose a threat after their release. A laek of soeial projeets and edueation 
has simply let a number of ex-eombatants relapse and join dissident groups, adding 
experieneed operatives. Improved edueation and soeietal reintegration of former 
paramilitaries is required before the next generation is reeruited by the very same 
disenfranehised ex-eombatant paramilitaries. The final soeial issue is the mutually 
exelusive British-Irish nationalisms and identities based upon Northern-Irishness that 


remains un-reeoneiled. The population needs an aeeeptable narrative and strueture. 

The Belfast Agreement only served to reduee this eompetitiveness. 

There is no standard model aeross the different government departments and 
jurisdietions to analyze the framework for peaee. Data is eolleeted in different ways. 


estimates, survey data, and there is no means to provide an analytieal perspeetive on a 
eonsistent basis. The Peace Monitoring Report, February 2012, is the first attempt, 
fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement but it laeks eomprehensive reeommendations. 


Fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement and subsequent framework, the eore 
soeio-ethnie dispute is unresolved; Northern Ireland remains a divided soeiety. Two 
exelusive sets of nationalists are still loeked in eompetition, destined by history to live 
side by side on the same land. The aims of many nationalists who took up arms 
originally to bring about a united Ireland have not been realized, any more than the aims 

th th 88 

of earlier generations in the late 19 and early 20 eenturies were fully aehieved. 
Jonathon Evans, Direetor-General of the Seeurity Serviee, stated “the pattern of history 
over the last hundred years shows that whenever the main body of Irish Republieanism 
has reaehed a politieal aoeommodation and rejoined eonstitutional polities, a hardliner 


rejeetionist group would fragment off and eontinue with the so ealled armed struggle.” 
Northern Ireland polities needs to eontinue its reform, balanee, and strueture to enable a 
seeure and stable framework for peaee. 

Uniting Ireland may no longer be a publie priority, but Republiean extremists may 
wish to return it to the publie arena as part of their strategy. Instead their use of violenee 
eontinues through dissidents who view the Provisional IRA as engaging “in a eolleetive 
aet of gross betrayal,” mirroring the history of the Irish Republiean Army (see Appendix 
D). This threat has been most reeently outlined in the British National Security Strategy, 
the Strategic Defense Security Review doeuments, and stated by Jonathon Evans, the 


Director-General of the Security Service. From a security perspective, the framework for 
peace is not stable and secure. 

Economics, as a line of development, did not prove a major hurdle in the way of a 
peace agreement, but it will arguably be a destabilizing force in the framework for the 
future. The five main factors of economic revival in 1998 are still prevalent in the 
framework for peace today. However, the business community lack confidence in the 
current economic downturn, there is a huge risk in the unemployment trap, and Northern 
Ireland is more reliant on external economic influences for its own revival. From an 
economic perspective, the framework for peace is not stable and secure. 

The Northern Ireland problem was a trinity that harbored entrenched socio-ethnic 
communal divisions, was home to a protracted low-intensity conflict, and was 
characterized by the repeated failure of local politicians to reach agreement on sharing 
power. The contributions from all sides, British and Irish, helped accommodate a 
compromise of peace for a strong civic society long divided within itself. The Troubles 
have left behind a terrible legacy fashioned by long years of emotion, suffering, fatigue 
and hate, of dead and wounded, with trauma that will take generations to heal. The social 
line of development within the framework for peace is still far from stable and secure. 

Northern Ireland is unlikely to ever know perfect peace. In order to overcome the 
disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a stable and secure future, the 
Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in governance inherent in the 
Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and economic challenges. A reformed 
Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future. 


Appendix A 


Origins and Causes ? 




Issues for ? 
Consideration ?. 

persona litiesiandl?! 























• British!?!\ 

• Irishlffii 
Internationa 14 


• Protesta nt/!S 


» Catholic/0 

• Other!?) 


' Republican! 

• Loyalists!?/ 

• Securit 



1. - 








A A 1 

1. V \. 

— y V- 

—- Za —, 



DemilitarizationB DevolutionlBfl?] 


























PPSI^NI )IJirocedu rePI 










Eariyi3^eleasei$cheme[ffl ReconciliationHI 





- Political[lnclusionllndl3teconciliation.l3 
- PoliticahIDividedllUnionism.lB 
- SecuritylShreatl2)fiDissidentl3tepublicana?iolence,llriminalityllndllerroristiactivityl2 
- SecurityUhangesaoli’olicingllndllCounter-Terrorism.S 
- SecuritylDemilitarizationl|NormaIization)[lndlDecommissioning.l3 

- HistoricallInquiriesE 


Appendix B 

Defining the language 

Words, definitions and nuances in language in the context of Irish history and 
politics are important. Geographically, Ulster was an historic province of Ireland and 
comprised the nine counties. Six counties of those nine now form Northern Ireland. The 
British Government only included six counties in Northern Ireland to guarantee a 
Protestant majority, leaving Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland. This is 
why Northern Ireland as Ulster is not correct. This paper uses Northern Ireland rather 
than Ulster, or alternatively the Province.^' The government of Northern Ireland is 
usually referred to as Stormont after Stormont Castle, where it sat and sits again. 

It is also important to draw the distinction between nationalists and Republicans. 
Nationalists refer to the entity of the community seeking support for a united Ireland, 
which is almost universally Catholic. Republicans demand completed independence 
under a Republican government, and are associated with a willingness to use physical 
force or armed struggle to achieve political goals. 

From the opposing side, the ideology of Unionism in Northern Ireland favors the 
continuation of some form of political union between Ireland and Great Britain and 
almost universally Protestant. Unionists are community focused on preserving the place 
of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Finally a Loyalist is a militant unionist 
in opposition to Irish Republicanism. 


Appendix C 

Geography of Northern Ireland^^ 

Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom. It is situated in the 
northeastern portion of the island of Ireland. It consists of six of the nine counties that 
were part of the former province of Ulster: Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, 
Londonderry, and Tyrone. 

Belfast is the Capital City and the Seat of Government. It comprises about one-sixth 
of the entire island with 5,463 square miles (14, 148 square kilometers), where the entire 
island consists of 32,595 square miles (84,431 square kilometers). The measurements of 
the island are 174 miles (280 kilometers) width, and 302 miles (486 kilometers) length. 
Northern Ireland measures about 85 miles (135 kilometers) north and south. It is about 
110 miles (175 kilometers) east and west. There is a spot in Northern Ireland that is only 
thirteen and one-half miles from Scotland, although most sea crossings were fifty miles in 
the southern part of the island and 70 miles in the northern part. The centerpiece of 
Northern Ireland's geography is Lough Neagh, at 151 square miles (391 km^) the largest 
freshwater lake both on the island of Ireland and in the British Isles. 


Appendix D 

Timeline of the Troubles 




1920 -1969 


Government of Ireland Act passed 

Partition of Ireland into North and South. Ancient 
Ulster was nine counties, but the British Government 
only included six counties in Northern Ireland to 
guarantee a Protestant majority - leaving Donegal, 
Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland. 


Formation of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary (USC) or ‘B’ Specials 

It was a reserve force called out in times of 
emergency, such as wars or insurgency. 


Formation of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) 

1956 - 1962 

Operation HARVEST 

The IRA border campaign. The border campaign 
failed as it had minimal support from the Catholic 
minority. It invited repressive cross-border measures 
such as internment, and was countered by the political 
will of the Northern Irish Brookeborough 
administration that consistently urged restraint. 

The IRA then sought to end partition by physical 
force, its statement that followed announced: 

“Out of this national liberation struggle a new Ireland 
will emerge, upright and free. In that New Ireland we 
shall build a country for all our people to live. That 
then is our aim: an independent, united, democratic 
Irish Republic. For this we shall light until the 
invader is driven from our soil and victory is ours.” 


UVF formed 

‘Gusty’ Spence appointed as the first UVF 


50'*' anniversary of the Easter Uprising 

UVF murders several people across Belfast 


Northern Ireland Civil Rights (NICRA) 

The nationalists sought an appropriate means of 
rectifying their inequitable treatment in a province in 
which they exerted scant influence. The political 
stagnation was replaced by NICRA challenge and 
confrontation. Although NICRA was essentially a 
moderate organization, it was prepared to extend 
earlier pressure group activity into civil disobedience. 


4 January 1969 

People’s Democracy march from Belfast to 
Londonderry attacked by Loyalists and 
Ulster Constabulary members (‘B’ Specials) 

10 August 1969 

Rioting in Belfast and Londonderry 

The ‘Battle of the Bogside’ in Londonderry 

14 August 1969 

British troops deploy onto Northern Ireland 

Underlying tensions had manifested themselves into 
sectarian conflict. The British troops were to 
stabilize British rule of Ulster and restore order. 

October 1969 

Publication of the Hunt Report 

It resulted in reshaping the RUC, the 
disbandment of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary and the formation of the 
Ulster Defense Regiment. 

The Hunt Report advised a re-shaping of the 
Northern Ireland’s Security Forces into a less 
partisan force, accountable to the public for its 
actions, and a police force civilian in nature. 



11 January 1970 

IRA splits into Official and Provisional 

The IRA final break, over an issue of historieal 
prineipal. The Marxist faetion of the Republiean 
movement wished to reeognize the legitimaey of the 
Dublin government, the traditionalists regarded this 
as heresy, the IRA split, and the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA) was bom. 

The PIRA vision was to eause the eollapse of the 
Northern Ireland administration and to infliet 
easualties on the British forees that would foree the 
British government, by publie opinion, to withdraw 
from Ireland. 


‘B’ Speeials disbanded; Ulster Defense 
Regiment formed 

Many Loyalists felt let down by this appeasement to 
the Nationalists and a threat of Irish Unity from the 
Hunt Report and the UVF started to retaliate 
themselves against Nationalists and ereate their own 
‘vigilante’ groups ealled’ defense assoeiations.’ 


6 February 1971 

First British soldier killed by IRA 

Gunner Robert Curtis was the first British soldier to 
have been killed in Ireland sinee 1921. 

9 August 1971 

Internment introdueed 

The British Government reluetantly agreed for 
Internment without trial on the assumption that Law 
and Order would be restored without the 
troublemakers. Whole eommunities were uprooted, 
300 Catholies lifted, 0 Protestants. The result after 
Internment was that it mobilized IRA to target 
Army/Seeurity Forees rather than just the Protestant 
eommunities, and resulted in a four-fold inerease in 
killings of soldiers. 

September 1971 

Ulster Defense Assoeiation (UDA) ereated 

This loyalist and vigilante group. It was formed to 
defend loyalist areas from attaek and to eombat 
Irish Republieanism. It used the Ulster Freedom 
Fighters (UFF) as its military arm. 


30 January 1972 

‘Bloody Sunday’ 

Soldiers from 1 Battalion, The Paraehute 
Regiment, open fire on eivil rights marehers. 27 
people wounded, 14 killed. It was one of the most 
signifieant ineidents that alienated Nationalists from 
the British Army, who had not yet signifieantly 
turned against them. The IRA swelled with 

Mareh 1972 

Northern Ireland Parliament dissolved 

Direet Rule established through the Northern 
Ireland Offiee at Westminster. 

21 July 1972 

‘Bloody Friday’ 

IRA detonates 22 bombs aeross Belfast, 9 killed and 
hundreds injured. 

31 July 1972 

Operation MOTORMAN 

Seeurity Forees retake the ‘no-go’ areas in the 
Nationalist areas of Belfast and Derry. Although it 
inflieted a short-term defeat on the IRA in both 
eities, it did not make the organization any less 
dangerous on other parts of Northern Ireland. 

9 Deeember 1973 

Sunningdale Agreement 

This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing 
Northern Ireland Exeeutive and a ‘eross-border’ 
Couneil of Ireland. 



May 1974 

Collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement 

Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general 
strike caused the collapse of the Agreement in May 

May 1974 

UVF bombings in Dublin 

Shankill and Portadown UVF units planted 3 car 
bombs in Dublin without warning. 33 killed. 

October & November 

IRA bombings on mainland UK 

Bombings of two Guildford pubs, 4 killed. 
Bombings of two Birmingham pubs, 19 killed 


9 February 1975 - 23 
January 1976 

IRA ceasefire 

The IRA agreed to a ceasefire in February 1975, 
which lasted nearly a year before the IRA 
concluded that the British were drawing them into 
politics without offering any guarantees in relation 
to the IRA's goals, and hopes of a quick victory 

Loyalists were concerned that there was a sell-out 
between the British and Irish Governments and 
feared for a united Ireland. 

As a result, the IRA launched a new strategy known 
as "the Long War". This saw them conduct a war of 
attrition against the British and increase emphasis 
on political activity, via the political party Sinn 


IRA reorganization for ‘The Long War’ strategy. 

IRA reorganization into cellular lines (Active 
Service Units) from a larger conventional military 
organizational principle. It was aimed at improving 
security and operational capacity. The only 
exception was the South Armagh Brigade. 

25 March 1976 

Police Primacy 

The announcement that the overt military lead in 
security policy would be scaled back in favor of 
‘police primacy’. The Intelligence lead transferred 
to the police into Tasking and Coordination Groups 


27 August 1979 

Lord Mountbatten killed 

The IRA blows up Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s 
cousin and former Chief of the Defense Staff 

Warrenpoint bombing 

The IRA in a double bomb attack near Warrenpoint 
kills 18 British Army soldiers. It was the most 
successful and best -planned IRA attack on the 
British Army of the Troubles. 


5 May 1981 

Hunger Strikes 

Bobby Sands becomes the first of the IRA hunger 
strikers to die, after 66 days’ fasting. 9 other IRA 
and INLA prisoners follow suit. 


Secret talks with British Government 

Gerry Adams begins the Secret Talks with the 
British Government. 



15 November 1985 

The Anglo-Irish Agreement 

British and Irish governments sign the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty; start of the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign (see 
Appendix E). 


1 November 1986 

Split of Sinn Fein 

Ard Fheis (Dublin) - birth of Republican 
Sinn Fein 

The Provisionals realized that they had to enter 
constitutional politics as well as fighting a war. 
This meant recognizing the Dublin Parliament and 
taking seats in it. Traditional Sinn Fein wanted to 
reject the institutions created by partition (Stormont 
and Dublin Governments). The Provisional and 
Republican movement split. 


8 May 1987 


SAS kill 8 IRA terrorists. 

8 November 1987 

Enniskillen bomb 

The IRA detonates a no-waming bomb next to the 
war memorial in Enniskillen, 11 killed, 63 injured. 


7 February 1991 

IRA mortars 10 Downing Street 

IRA continues its mainland campaign in an attempt 
to force concessions from the British Government. 


31 August 1994 

IRA ceasefire - ends its military hostilities 

This saw the development of the peace process. 

The politics of the conflict remained unresolved and 
there was little movement towards an all-inclusive 
dialogue at this stage. There needed a peaceful 
background, a non-violent situation to offer the 
prospect of permanent dialogue rather than 
increased polarization. 

13 October 1994 

Loyalist paramilitaries announce ceasefire 


Talks between British and Irish government and paramilitary 

The governments attempted the reconciliation of the 
seemingly irreconcilable in terms of the political 
problems of Northern Ireland 


9 February 1996 

Canary Wharf bomb - IRA ends ceasefire 

Sinn Fein’s entry into all-inclusive talks was 
delayed. The IRA had felt that they had been duped 
by the British Government and could not withhold 
frustrations at grass roots any longer. The mainland 
attacks purposes were simply to get Sinn Fein into 
the negotiations rather than a united Ireland 

15 June 1996 

IRA bombs Manchester city center 


Widespread civil disturbance 

Orange Order parade at Drumcree, County Armagh, 
leads to widespread civil disturbances across the 

7 October 1996 

IRA bombs British Army HQ in Lisburn 

Two 5001b bombs, 1 killed and 20 injured. 


12 February 1997 

Lance Bombadier Stephen Restorick killed 
by South Armagh sniper team 

Last soldier to die under Operation BANNER 

20 July 1997 

IRA ceasefire 

IRA reinstates its ceasefire. Political developments 
resumed with the election of a new government in 
Britain and Ireland. 



10 April 1998 

The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 

The peace process arrived in April 1998, as political 
agreement was reached. This represented the 
culmination of exhaustive multi-party, 
intergovernmental and bilateral talks. At the heart 
of the agreement was the principle of consent for 
constitutional change in Northern Ireland. 

May 1998 

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 

Sinn Fein called a special Ard Fheis when delegates 
voted overwhelmingly to allow successful 
candidates to take their seats in the proposed 
Assembly at Stormont. As a result of this decision, 
the policy on Sinn Fein abstentionism now only 
applies to the British parliament at Westminster.^^ 

15 August 1998 

Omagh Bombing 

The Real IRA, the Republican splinter group, 
explodes a no-waming car bomb in Omagh, County 
Tyrone, killing 29 people and two unborn children. 


29 November 1999 

Power-Sharing executive appointed 

2 December 1999 

Power devolved to Stormont 

Direct rule ends, power devolved to Stormont from 


14 October 2002 

Suspension of devolution 

IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of 
the power-sharing executive and the suspension of 
devolution. This started the longest suspension 
until May 2007. 


28 July 2005 

IRA calls an end to its armed campaign 

IRA reports in the open media that it has allegedly 
decommissioned the last of its weapons and 


October 2006 

St Andrews Agreement 

Multi-Party Talks (see Appendix E). 


8 May 2007 

Devolution returns to Stormont executive 

Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a 
power-sharing executive. 

31 July 2007 

Operation BANNER ends 

October 2007 

MI5 (Security Service) took over primacy 
for national security intelligence work in 
Northern Ireland.^’ 


Appendix E 

Summary of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements 





Government of Ireland Act passed 

Partition of Ireland into North and South 

7 June 1921-30 
March 1972 

The Parliament of Northern Ireland 

The Parliament consistently chose the Ulster Unionist Party to 
govern the region. 


Republic of Ireland Act 

Staunch lobbying from the Northern Ireland Prime Minster Sir 
Basil Brooke saw Northern Ireland remain an integral part of the 
United Kingdom.’* 

30 March 1972 

Suspension of the NI Parliament 
and the introduction of direct rule 

The NI Parliament was initially suspended and then formally 
abolished in 1973 under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 
1973. Civil servants in Whitehall would have to assume all of 
the responsibilities previously exercised by the Northern Ireland 
Civil Service (NICS).” 

9 December 1973 

Sunningdale initiative 

This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern 

Ireland Executive and cross-border Council of Ireland of shared 
Protestant and Catholic government power sharing. 

- For Loyalists this was a sell-out. The Ulster Workers Council 
initiated a huge strike; bringing down the agreement by 
paralyzing the Province, using psychological intimidation to the 
public. Universal loyalist support, of all loyalists’ persuasions, 
was in revolt. Northern Ireland politicians in step behind the 

Harold Wilson made his speech remarking that the people of 
Northern Ireland were “spongers.” The Province was paralyzed; 
loyalists had defied Westminster, through a combination of 
sheer numbers, industrial muscle and paramilitary power. They 
had taken over state and the Sunningdale initiative was kicked 
out and caused the collapse of the initiative in May 1974. 


(Secret Talks) 

Secret contact between British 
Government and the IRA was 

The so-called ‘Christmas-ceasefire’ was negotiated. 


(Secret Talks) 

IRA ceasefire 

Serious negotiations on structures of disengagement. It was 
neatly ambiguous for both sides to interpret as they wished. The 
British Government had no intention of a Political withdrawal, 
the Loyalists began an autumn resurgence, suspicious of a sell¬ 
out, and the IRA walked out. 


(Secret Talks) 

Hunger Strike proposals 

There was a set of proposals to manage the end of the first 
hunger strike, but only ended in revised prison rules, 
inflexibility on the part of prison staff and management, rather 
than the ‘political prisoner’ status the Republicans sought. 

15 November 

Anglo-Irish agreement 

Anglo-Irish agreement. Overall, it laid the foundations for 
future progress through shared understandings. It promoted 
cross-border cooperation. It did not involve concepts such as 
joint sovereignty and limited Dublin’s involvement to a 
consultative role. 

Two principles were laid down which have been retained in all 
subsequent arrangements: that the Irish government should have 
a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland; there could be no change 


in the eonstitutional status of Northern Ireland without the 
eonsent of the majority (the ‘eonsent prineiple’). 

The Unionists, who believed that it gave Dublin a direct 
involvement with the affairs of NI, rejected it. They formed the 
slogan, “Ulster says no.”'°' 

The Republicans believed that it was aimed at blocking the rise 
of Sinn Fein and instead reward the Nationalist SDLP who 
rejected the use of violence. 

9 November 1990 

The Brooke-Mayhew Talks: 
Seeretary of State Northern Ireland 

The Secretary of State Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, declares 
that Britain has no selfish strategic or economic interest in 
Northern Ireland. 


The Hume-Adams Talks 

The development of a nationalist position and an understanding 
of how the core principle of self-determination could be 


(Seeret Talks) 

Route to Peaee 

This was the British Government strategy to show the IRA that 
their only progress was through the political process of Sinn 

Fein and not political violence. 

15 Deeember 

Downing Street Declaration 

Downing Street Declaration - This established that there 
would be no constitutional change without the agreement of the 
people of Northern Ireland: the principal of consent. 

- In June 1993, the new Irish PM, Albert Reynolds, built a broad 
Nationalist alliance and coalition in negotiation with the British. 
On the 3rd December 1993, Major/Reynolds met. The position 
of the British was not persuaders for Irish Unity, and insisted on 
Unionist consent for any settlement. The Irish stood firm on 

15 December 1993 at Dublin Castle the deal was finally done. 
Reynolds got self-determination but in a separate referendum 
north and south. Major got his principal of Unionist consent but 
the unions had to be kept on board otherwise it was worthless. 

The result was a joint framework document, with 20 drafts. 

This led to the 1st September 1994 IRA declaration of ceasefire, 
believing that the declaration was genuine. This started a new 
phase, a turning point in the strategy. 

The IRA ceasefire allowed their representatives in Sinn Fein to 
conduct meaningful negotiations at the heart of the conflict, in 
essence political space. 

10 April 1998 

Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement. 

- The Northern Ireland Act 1998 

The Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement (or Sunningdale for 
slow learners!) was based upon the principle of power sharing 
under the D’Hondt method to ensure that Northern Ireland’s 
largest political communities, the unionist and nationalist 
communities both participate in governing the region. 

Acceptance of the Belfast Agreement owed far more to changes 
in republicanism than any fundamental change in British policy 
towards Northern Ireland. 

It instigated the Patten Report, which in Sep ’99 recommended 

175 major changes to the RUC, including a name change, a 
Policing Board and a Police Ombudsman. 


29 November 

Power-Sharing executive 

IRA announcement that it is also in contact with the 
Decommissioning Commission 

2 December 1999 

Stormont rule 

- Direct mle ends, power devolved to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly at Stormont from Westminster. 

- The North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish 
Ministerial Council take effect. 

- The Anglo-Irish Agreement is replaced by the British-Irish 

- Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution are amended to remove 
its territorial claim on Northern Ireland. 

February - May 

Power devolved 

Assembly suspended over the issue of decommissioning. Direct 
rule imposed from Westminster temporarily re-imposed until the 
IRA then announced that it would put its arms beyond use. 

June 2001 

Westminster and Local 
Government Elections 

Significant swing towards the Sinn Fein and Democratic 

Unionist Party. 

14 October 2002 

Suspension of devolution 

IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of the power¬ 
sharing executive and the suspension of devolution. 

13 October 2006 

St Andrews Agreement 

The Northern Ireland (St 
Andrews Agreement) Act 2006 

The Northern Ireland (St 
Andrews Agreement) Act 2007 

An agreement between the British and Irish Governments and 
the political parties to broker a deal on the devolution of power 
to Northern Ireland. It set a target date for 27 March 2007. Key 
elements of the agreement were: 

• Full acceptance by Sinn Fein to support the Police 

Service of Northern Ireland, courts and the mle of law 
(devolution of policing and justice). 

• Restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly the 
following year with a new Northern Ireland Executive. 

• Commitment by the DUP to power sharing with 
Republicans and Nationalists in the Northern Ireland 

7 March 2007 

Northern Ireland elections 

Northern Ireland goes to the polls to elect candidates to the 

The DUP are the largest party, winning 36 of the 108 seats. 

Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 18, the SDLP 16, and 
the Alliance Party 7 seats. 

8 May 2007 

Devolution returns to Stormont 
executive (after almost 5 years) 

Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a power-sharing 

The Assembly met and elected Ian Paisley and Martin 
McGuinness as First Minister and deputy First Minister. 

5 June 2008 

New First Minister - Peter 

Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness are appointed first and 
deputy first ministers of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Mr 
Robinson was nominated by former DUP leader Ian Paisley and 
Mr McGuinness by Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams 

4 February 2010 

The Hillsborough Agreement - 

Devolution of Policing and Justice 

DUP reached a deal with Sinn Fein over the devolution of 
policing and justice powers from Westminster to Northern 


This included the British and Irish Prime Ministers mediating 
talks at Hillsborough 25-27 January 2010. 

12 April 2010 

Powers of Devolution and Justice 
transferred to the Assembly 


5 May 2011 

2011 election for the Northern 
Ireland Assembly 

Following the results of the election, Peter Robinson of the DUP 
and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein were nominated and 
subsequently re-elected as First Minister and deputy First 

Minister on 12 May 2011. 

The DUP are the largest party, winning 38 of the 108 seats. 

Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 16, the SDLP 14, and 
the Alliance Party 8 seats. 


Appendix F 

Analysis of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements 

Of all the political agreements, the Sunningdale Agreement December 1973 was 
the most problematic while the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 was the 
most significant as it laid the foundations for the successful Belfast Agreement of 1998. 
The resilience of the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) to strike in May 1974 in protest to 
the Sunningdale Agreement, inspired by the Vanguard Party and the DUP, brought 
Northern Ireland to its knees. The strike effectively broke British policy in Ulster and 
ensured Protestant Unionists would not have power sharing with a nationalist dimension 
thrust upon them. For the Downing Street Declaration, the British and Irish 
governments achieved in tortuous phraseology to ‘square the circle’ of Unionist and 
Republican rhetoric. It established the principled framework within which the future of 
Northern Ireland could then be discussed. The considered ambiguity conceded the 
abstract principle of self-determination to the Irish people (the nationalist position) but 
retained the operative principle of self-determination for the ‘greater number’ in Northern 
Ireland (the Unionist position). This enabled the launch pad for the Belfast Agreement, 
which marked the most significant rapprochement in Anglo-Irish relations since the 
partition of the island of Ireland in 1921. 


Appendix G 

The Mitchell Principles 

The Mitchell Principles were six ground rules agreed by the Irish and British 
governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland regarding participation in talks 
on the future of the region. They were named after the Senator George Mitchell who 
chaired the all-party talks. All involved in the negotiations had to agree to their 

The principles appear in the report of the International Body on Arms 


Decommissioning; Principles of Democracy and Non-Violence, January 1996: 

1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues. 

2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. 

3. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an 
independent commission. 

4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or 
threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party 

5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations 
and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any 
aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree. 

6. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to 
prevent such action. 

Lesson Learnt: the reason why the Mitchell Principles were so successful is best 
described by Fisher and Ury in the book “Getting to Yes:” “The more you bring 
standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit to bear on your particular problem, 
the more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise and fair.”^°^ 


Appendix H 

Security Statistics 

The security and stability of the framework for peace is more than just the 
measurement of overt cases of violence using security statistics for deaths, injuries, 
bombings, shootings, arrests and convictions but it does provide a suitable framework for 
analysis. By relying on these trends alone risks what Johann Galtung calls “negative 
peace” - that is peace defined simply by the absence of violence. 

1 . Figure 1, Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK - 2009 and 2010. 

Figures on the left are numbers of arrests; figures along the bottom are the terrorist 
related areas of arrest. This figure shows the increase in the Northern Irish Related 
Terrorism arrests in comparison to the rest of UK arrests. 




(including AQ 



NIRT in Great 

Not Classified 

• 2009 

• 2010 










2. Figure 2. Security Related Incidents (1998 - 2011). The following 

statistics are from the PSNI for shooting, incendiary and bombing incidents only.''^ 
The figures on the left are number of incidents against time on the bottom axis. It is 
important to note that the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity 
illustrated at Figure 6 uses a very different metric, across a wider range of activities, 
than this generalist PSNI statistic. 

-1-1 I I-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1- 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

Incendiaiy Devices used 
^^“Incendiaiy Incidents 
^ = Bombings - devices used 
^^“Bombiiig Incidents 
‘■^“Shooting Incidents 

The following types of shooting incidents are included; 

• Shots fired by terrorists 

• Shots fired by the security forces 

• Paramilitary-style attacks involving shootings 

• Shots heard (and later confirmed) 

• Other violent incidents where shots are fired (eg armed robbery) 

An individual bombing incident may involve one or more explosive devices. Incidents 
recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used). Incidents involving hoax 
devices, petrol bombings or incendiaries are excluded. 

Incidents recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used). 


3. Figures, Firearms Finds (1998 - 2011). The following statistics are 

from the PSNl. The figures on the left are the number of firearms offences against 
time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own unless checked 
against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is beyond the 
classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the number of offences 
continues to rise in the last five years. _ 


1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

4. Figure 4, Explosives Finds (1998 - 2011). The following statistics are 

from the PSNL The figures on the left are the weight of explosive finds (kgs) 
against time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own 
unless checked against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is 
beyond the classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the 
number of large explosive finds has reduced in the last five years, leading to more 
high tech UVlEDs. _ 

Explosives (Kgs) 

►Explosives (Kgs) 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 


5. Figure The following chart shows the 2009/10 range of offence that 

charges brought against persons detained in Northern Ireland under section 41 of the 
Terrorism Act (2006) by individual offence. It demonstrates the significant number of 
offences that are linked to violent terrorist acts and the mix of terrorism and criminality 
for a police counter-terrorist strategy. Of those persons detained and charged, 50% were 
for membership, possession of terrorist purposes and collection of information. 


- Min der 

a Attempted Murder 
Explosives Offences 

- Firearms Offences 

- Conspiracy to cause explosion 

- Membership 

- Bni'glaiy 

• Offences against the pei son 

Possession of Documents / 

- Criminal Damage 


- Conspiracy to pei'vert justice 

- Possession of offensive weapon 

Possession of articles of use to 



Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity. 

a. Figure 6.'^^ This illustrates the use of the Violent Dissident Republiean 
(VDR) event aetivity 1997 - 2010. The data supports the argument that the threat 
posed by VDR organizations remains substantial with a dramatic rise in activity 
for 2009 and 2010. VDR as a metric is outlined in more detail below, in Figure 7. 


b. Figure 7,'^^ VDR is activity measured by type. The chart below shows 
how the different types of activity for 2010 have led to the spike of VDR seen 
above. This data indicates that the strategy of the dissident groups is not just to 
disrupt normalization through attempted high-level bombings and hoax activity, 
but also to use violence from assaults and crime through robberies to demonstrate 
their own authority.” 

Number of Incidents in 2010 

- Shootings and Punishment 

■ Defused Bomb Incidents 

Ho;ix Incidents 

- Detonated Bomb Incidents 

Petrol Bomb Incidents 
X Assaults 

Violent Riots 
Arson Incidents 
Violent Robberies 


c. Figure 8/'^ This breaks out the VDR by grouping. The unknown 
perpetrators are unattributable to any dissident Republiean grouping. Analysis 
has proven that this could be down to RIRA, consistent with previous patterns of 
failure to immediately claim responsibility for events or simply media confusion 
about the emergence of ONH. Aside from the attribution to a group, there 
remain s a significant spike of attacks in 2010. 



♦- •♦ONH 


RIRA and/or 

RIRA and/or 

RIRA and/or 
CIRA and/or 

RIRA and/or 

— — Unknown 



d. Figure 9. This show the bombing incidents detonated and diffused from 
1997 to 2010. This increase in high-level activity supports the assumption that 
2010 saw a growing sophistication in tactics, technology, and determination on 
the part of the dissidents. This bombing data supports the official rise in the threat 
level from moderate to substantial. 



e. Figure 10. Hoax devices. A defining tactic of the dissident groups has 
been to disrupt the normalization of Northern Irish society. They have aimed to do 
so through the inducement of fear and the disruption of routine activity through 
their attacks and the resultant ongoing security alerts that intend to cause routine 

f 2011. Although figures for the second half of 2011 are yet to be released, 
there has been a reduction from 2010. Some analysts, especially the Belfast 
Telegraph, ascertain that this is firstly due to turf wars within the dissident 
groupings. Secondly the reduction is down to the success of the security forces, 
especially in the south of Ireland, where it has made “serious intelligence in-roads 
into the three main groupings.” There have also been suggestions that the 
dissident targeting has switched to an “economically driven campaign against 
strategic capitalist targets.” Whatever the statistics for 2011 say, there is still 
incoherence and division amongst the dissident groupings but with a goal to still 
continue their “armed struggle.” 



Figure 11, Deaths by status of the person killed (1969 - 1999). 


• Total 3529. 

. British Security Forces 

» Civilian (1842) 

Irish Security (10) 

« Loyalist ParamilitaiY 

Republican ParamilitaiY 

8. At the height of its eommitment in 1973, the Security Forces had 25,343 

troops in Northern Ireland, distinctly more than the 9,000 British troops in Afghanistan 

today. The most deadly year was 1972, when the IRA went on the offensive against 


British troops; approximately 130 soldiers were killed in hostile action. 


Appenidix I 

Republican/ Nationalist Perspective 

The Republican position - The motive for Irish Republieanism has been in 
opposition to British rule. It alleged diserimination and marginalization against Catholics 
by attempting to create an impression of inferiority and subdue/ eliminate their cultural 
identity, and a feeling that Ireland was economically disadvantaged and subservient to the 
United Kingdom. 

From the late 1940’s, there was a distinct lack of nationalists in the political 
process able to achieve the abolition of the border in a peaceful manner. As a result a 
more militant Republicanism quickly usurped constitutional nationalism. In 1969, there 
was a nationalist community perception that they were at war. At a Sinn Fein/ IRA Ard 
Fheis in January 1970, the Republican movement formally split. The dissidents’ who left 
in favor of a more proactive defense of beleaguered Catholic communities became known 
as the Provisionals and they began its all-out offensive against what it claimed was 
British occupation. The IRA that was left called itself the Official Irish Republican 
Army, rejecting the political legitimacy of the Provisionals. 

Republican strategy - The Provisional IRA strategy of Republican action has 


remained “the unswerving commitment to the armed struggle”. 

• The ‘Initial Phase’ of 1970 - 1972 - This was what the Security Forces 
termed as the insurgency phase. 1972 was the worst year of the Troubles. In 
total, the IRA carried out 1,200 operations that year, bidding to make Northern 
Ireland unstable and hasten the departure of the British state. By 1975, the 
hope of a PIRA quick military victory was low. A ceasefire was negotiated, the 


IRA believing that this was the start of a long-term proeess of British withdrawal. 
The eeasefire was troublesome for the IRA as it led to infiltration by informers, 
the arrest of many aetivists and a breakdown of IRA diseipline. By early 1976, 
the IRA leadership, short of money, weapons and members, broke off the 

• The Long War - Under the leadership of Gerry Adams, there was a 
transformation of the IRA. It evolved a new strategy termed the ‘Long War,’ 
which underpinned IRA strategy for the rest of the Troubles. The IRA was 
restructured, redefined and an increased emphasis on a political strategy with 
violence to achieve their aims (bullet and ballot box), maintaining a propaganda 
war using Sinn Fein as the voice of the Republican movement. 

• Political Violence/ Hunger Strikes - The Republican hunger strike in the 
Maze prison in 1981, to recognize the Republican prisoners as ‘political 
status’/prisoners of war, led to the death of ten IRA and INLA, including Bobby 
Sands who had been elected as a Member of Parliament for Fermanagh and South 
Tyrone. Sands’ death was the watershed for the Republican movement. It 
generated influence and national and international media interest. More 
significantly as an unexpected byproduct of the hunger strike, it proved what 
Gerry Adams had long argued might be possible, of convincing Republicans, of 
the value of electoral politics much sooner than expected. Adams recognized 
from this that the nationalists had a reservoir of support that if skillfully tapped, 
could build the broad political base with a credible political strategy that he 


believed was neeessary to move the cause forward alongside their terrorist 

• Electoral Strategy - The Republican electoral strategy then developed 
and by 1985 Sinn Fein had flourished and won 12% of the vote in the council 
elections. Sinn Fein was on the rise while IRA was being contained. The Tong 
war’ strategy had exacted a heavy toll from the Republican community in terms 
of lives, prison sentences and quality-of-life opportunities.'^^ It was matched by a 
dramatic increase in loyalist assassinations of Republicans in the early 1990s. 

The Republican use of violence was becoming counter-productive, risking 
alienating nationalist and Republicans’ core support. Political violence started to 
lead to exclusion, demonization and lack of legitimacy. This led to the Sinn 

Fein leader and the SDLP leader John Hume conceptualizing a political strategy 
for nationalist unity. 

• Exporting Republicanism - Throughout this Republican strategy 
transition, the IRA continued to export Republicanism. The IRA/Libya 
connection smuggled a considerable amount of weaponry, ammunition and 
military capability that transformed the IRA’s tactical operations. In an 
attempt to exert more political concessions from the British Government the IRA 
bombed or threatened security forces in Germany, the Netherlands, Gibraltar and 
Great Britain, opening new fronts in the terror campaign. They also sought 
support from Irish diaspora communities abroad, in particular from the United 
States, whose sympathizers provided financial and moral support, as well as 




• The Belfast Agreement of 1998. The important reality was that 
Republieans had aeknowledged and aceepted that there was a ehoiee other than 
political violence and that it was a choice that most of the leadership had made to 
mark a “generational truce.” For Republicans, the acceptance of the consent 
principle was justified by the belief that the framework for peace was only a 
temporary construct and would give way in time to a united Ireland once 
demographics prevailed in favor of the catholic majority. Nationalists are still on 
this journey. In contrast, Totalitarian Republicanism will always believe in the 
armed struggle to achieve constitutional nationalism of a united Ireland. This 
extremist view perceives that the acceptance of the Belfast Agreement marked the 
Provisional IRAs’ great historical betrayal 


Appendix J 

Loyalist/ Unionist perspective 

The Unionist position - The motive for unionists has always been to resist any 
attempt to foree Home Rule from Ireland upon them, fighting the nationalists attempting 
to hasten Britain’s total disengagement, while the British Government have always hinted 
at a steady proeess of disengagement in Ireland sinee World War I. The resolve of 
Unionists in maintaining the link with Great Britain has been for a variety of eeonomie, 


soeial and politieal reasons. 

The Loyalist position - The establishment of the Ulster Volunteer Force was to 
protect the Unionists and the project of Home Rule for Ireland floundered amid the 
staunch opposition of Ulster Unionists. The coercive nature of the Unionist demands was 
persuasive, dictated primarily by the need to prevent anger boiling over into reprisals. 

The re-establishment of the UVF in November 1965 re-instigated the loyalist 
paramilitary structure, boosted further by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) by 1971. 

Loyalism - In the 1960s, if there was one trigger that unleashed the loyalist 
sectarian ‘genie’, it was the fundamentalist Presbyterian preacher, the Reverend Ian 
Paisley. He saw the growing rapprochement between the Unionist Stormont government 
and Dublin as a treachery and a betrayal of the Protestant faith, Protestant Ulster and the 
unionist intransigent position that he would become infamous for. His leadership alone 
voiced the strong resentment of the Ulster people, more so than any leading Unionist 
leader at the time. He created the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UVP) as his support to 
attack the liberal leaning policies of Terence O’Neill in the Northern Ireland Parliament, 
who had promised to “transform the face of Ulster” but O’Neill fatally misunderstood the 



dynamics of sectarianism. Although his political rhetoric never endorsed seetarian 
violenee, Paisley would use his leadership and influenee to ineite anger and fury towards 
the nationalist eommunity. He flirted with the loyalist paramilitaries on-and-off 
throughout his eareer to further his own gains, whilst never overtly supporting their 
aetions, ranging from the UVF, the UVP to the Ulster Resistanee. Protestant militaney 
emerged as a formidable foree in Northern Ireland on the streets and then into polities. 

Loyalist strategy - The Loyalist strategy throughout was the defense of their 
Protestant Ulster and to reaet to the eonfliet of Irish Republieans on their eommunities. 
The publie pereeption was that if the security forces eould not defend them, they would 
have to do it themselves. As a result the paramilitaries were thought of as defenders of 
their eommunities rather than psyehopaths or killers. At a taetieal level Loyalist 
paramilitaries did not possess the same degree of teehnieal sophistieation that marked the 
Provisional IRA out as a deadly organization. However, this made them no less 
dangerous. In the early 70s, the eonstant Loyalist attacks failed to degrade the nationalist 
popular support for the IRA, instead it strengthened its status. By the 1980s and early 
1990s, they had shifted from a random sectarian campaign of violence to a more focused 
and eoordinated effort to assassinate Republicans. Accused of eollusion with the 
Seeurity Forees, Sir John Stevens, the former Metropolitan Poliee Commissioner, 
undertook investigations as to some of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) murders 
between 1987 and 2003. His report coneluded: “.. .there was eollusion in both murders 
and the eireumstanees surrounding them. Collusion is evideneed in many ways. This 
ranges from the willful failure to keep reeords, the absence of aceountability, the 
withholding of intelligenee and evidenee, through to the extreme of agents being 



involved in murder.” While loyalism had aequired a greater military eapaeity, it also 
developed a more sophistieated leadership. 

Electoral strategy - The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster 
Demoeratie Party (UDP) often appeared more pragmatie and willing to eompromise than 
the eonstitutional unionist parties. Key to the Unionist eampaign throughout the 
Troubles was the threat of its raw strength of protest (evident in both the Sunningdale and 
Anglo-Irish Agreements). Unionist paranoia has always feared that they only have to 
be unlueky onee, that they only have to make one serious error of judgment, and the pass 
to Irish unity would be sold.'"^^ As an emerging Peaee Proeess developed, unionist 
members of the business seetor, eivil soeiety as well as influential members of the Ulster 
Unionist Party sought a eloser engagement with the politieal proeess. The Demoeratie 
Unionist Party (DUP) was intransigent, by maintaining a positional bargaining 
strategy,unwilling to aeeept the admission of Sinn Fein, boyeotting inter-party talks. 
The Peaee Proeess divided unionism between the pragmatists and the traditionalists, this 
division was still evident at the reeent devolution of Polieing and Justiee in 2010. The 
division of unionism alone was one of the eauses for the eonfliet to be so intraetable. 


Appendix K 

British Government and Security Force perspective 

The Security Force position - The key objective for the Security Forces was to 
stabilize the situation to facilitate a political settlement. 

The COIN Strategy - The Security Forces strategy started as largely widespread 
maintenance of law and order. Initially the Army kept a tentative peace; but the decision 
in 1971 by the IRA to go on the offensive saw the Security Forces (that included the 
police and military) respond with a counter-insurgency drive against the insurgents. 
Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern 
Ireland between 1971 and 1973 perceptively concluded: “the hard fact is that in guerilla 
war the enemy holds the initiative for large parts of the time and information is the key to 
defeat.”Without the flow of key sections of the population, the flow of information 
soon dried up. 

The Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Successive British Governments tried to end 
the bloodshed with a variety of political solutions, even talking to the IRA, all of which 
had failed. It was clear that by 1976, politics had reached a dead-end and that the IRA 
was determined to carry on killing. The Government made security its principal line of 
operation and intelligence gathering became a priority. The new “Way Ahead” 
security policy, known as Police Primacy meant that the RUC would assume the lead and 
the Army subordinate. This had political and presentational attractions from the 
British Government’s viewpoint: no homeland war had to be declared, RUC confidence 
would be restored and place the police back on the front foot to start the long road to 


normalization. This started essential tripartite eohesion and coordination between the 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO), RUC and the Army. 

Police Primacy - From 1977, the Army’s role was scaled back to provide military 
support to the police in counter-terrorist operations; special operations became the cutting 
edge, with an evidence-based approach to counter terrorism. The appointment of Roy 
Mason as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1976 radically bolstered the 
special operations forces with Special Air Service and Special Duties covert units. 
Mason’s focus was covert action and the secret war against the IRA. The strategy was 
for “reassurance, deterrence and attrition. Overt activities reassured, by dominating the 
ground in the hope of raising public confidence in the security forces, and deterred by 
show of force, denying the terrorists the space to operate on; covert operations caused 

Targeting - The difficulty in the counter terrorist targeting was the balance in 
maintaining the stability of the paramilitary leadership, to leave them in place long 
enough to secure credibility and influence to negotiate with, versus destroying their 
ability to destabilize the road to peace using political violence. In order to create the 
political space, different strategies were used against different individuals and groupings 
from coercing, cajoling and enticing into eventually suing for peace. 

The Security Force effects - This effective combination of military operations 
led to significant attrition of the terrorist groups, an undermining of the terrorists purpose 
from within their own popular support and a growing public recognition of the futility of 
paramilitary activity. It forced the IRA back to the negotiating table in the early ‘90’s. 
The Security Forces held the line with a battle of wills against the Republican and 


Loyalist terrorist groups. The impaet of the Seeurity Forees allowed a wider and strategie 


plan to be implemented and developed. 



Ard Fheis 

Sinn Eein Gonference 


Gontinuity Irish Republican Army 


Democratic Unionist Party 


European Union 


Gaelic Athletic Association 


General Officer Gommanding 


Historical Enquiries Team 


Irish Republican Army 


Eoyalist Volunteer Eorce 


Member of Parliament 


Northern Ireland Givil Rights Association 


Northern Ireland Givil Service 


Northern Ireland Executive 


Northern Ireland Office 


Official Irish Republican Army 


Provisional Irish Republican Army 


Police Service of Northern Ireland 


Progressive Unionist Party 


Royal Irish Regiment 


Real Irish Republican Army 


Republican Sinn Eein 


Royal Ulster Gonstabulary 


Special Air Service 


Social Democratic and Eabor Party 


Sinn Eein 


Ulster Defense Association 


Ulster Democratic Party 


Ulster Defense Regiment 


Ulster Ereedom Eighters 


United Kingdom Unionist Party 


Ulster Unionist Party 


Ulster Volunteer Eorce 


Ulster Protestant Volunteers 


Ulster Workers Gouncil 



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^ Roger MacGinty, “Northern Ireland: A Peace Process thwarted by Accidental Spoiling,” in 
Challenges to Peace Building, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo, 
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 154. 

^ Orangeism is derived from the Orange Institution (more commonly known as the Orange Order 
or Orange Lodge). It is a Protestant fraternal organization based mainly in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. Politically, it is strongly linked to unionism. 

^ Explanations of why discrimination occurred differ over three main issues: (1) the value of 
Protestant privileges, (2) the extent of Protestant unity across social classes, (3) the role, if any, of 
the British Government, in promoting sectarianism. 

Aaron Edwards, Essential Histories. The Northern Ireland Troubles; Operation BANNER 
1969-2007 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2011), 7. 

^ Edwards, 27. 

Edwards, 29. 

^ Peter Taylor, Loyalists (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2000). 

* Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princetown, 

NJ: Princetown University Press, 1976), 89. 

^ Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” 
Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995, 3. It is this work from 
Bassford that connects the Northern Ireland conflict into a trinity, rather than the “non-trinitarian” 
Martin van Creveld and John Keegan explanation that consigns Clausewitz to irrelevance. 

There is risk that this over simplifies the complexity of the terrorist groupings. Categorizing 
Republican and Loyalist as simply “non-rational actors” ignores some of the deliberate terrorist 
strategies laid out in Appendix I (Republican), and Appendix J (Loyalist). The second and third 
order effects of their strategies did indeed lead to non-rational action. 

" John Wilsey, The Ulster Tales - A tribute to those who served 1969 - 2000 (South Yorkshire, 
United Kingdom: Pen & Sword, 2011), 123. 

Roger MacGinty, and John Darby, Guns and Government - The Management of the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process (New York, United States: Palgrave, 2002), 21. 

Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Joint Doctrine 
Publication 3-40: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009), 170. This 
defines Decisive Condition as: “a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to 
achieve or support the desired condition.” 

Roger MacGinty, “Northern Ireland: A Peace Process thwarted by Accidental Spoiling,” in 
Challenges to Peace Building, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo, 
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 156. 

MacGinty, & Darby, 4. 

Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes - Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 
(Middlesex, United Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd: 1983), 7. 

’’ In comparison the Northern Ireland Progress Monitoring Report 2012 breaks the dimensions of 
the peace process into four distinct but interlocking dimensions of Security, Equality, Political 
progress, and Cohesion and Sharing. 

It is the author’s opinion that the assurance from the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) and the announcement from the IRA that their “arms had been put 
beyond use,” is still a source of huge ambiguity. The issue of decommissioning was vital to 
progress the framework for peace, but to what level of decommissioning? There is still no open 
source evidence of paramilitary decommissioning or true definition of what condition has been 
met to progress the peace process. Many media reports still state that the paramilitary weapons 
and munitions are simply locked away in secure bunkers. Instead it was simply a risk mitigation 


process for Republican movement, essentially how much did they have to bargain for political 

'^Edwards, 10. 

Oliver Ramsbotham in Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 214, explains that as the conflict is 
brought to an end by a peace process, its essence lies precisely in the effort to persuade 
undefeated conflict parties that their persisting and undiminished aims can best be served by non¬ 
violent politics rather than violence. This cessation of violence is traded for other commodities, 
such as political opportunity through inclusion. This is the “continuation of war into politics.” 

MacGinty & Darby, 176. 

MacGinty & Darby, 171. 

MacGinty & Darby, 177. 

MacGinty & Darby, 24. 

Edwards, 14. 

British and Irish Governments, The Framework Documents - A New Framework For 
Agreement, by the British and Irish Governments (Eondon: Prime Minister's Office, 22 February 

Edwards, 73. 

First visit was in 30 November 1995, 15 months after the IRA’s first ceasefire. Second visit 
was following the dissident Republican bombing in Omagh. Third visit was 12 December 2000 
attempting to break the political deadlock threatening the power-sharing executive. 

MacGinty & Darby, 25. 

The Belfast Telegraph, “Bill Clinton visits Northern Ireland with plan for economic recovery,”, September 30, 2010, 
1496241 l.html (accessed 06 April 2012). 

Since May 2011, the position of US Special Envoy for Economic Affairs in Northern Ireland 
has not been fdled since the resignation of Declan Kelly. In a leaked Wikileak cable he was 
alleged to have conveyed the message that the Northern Ireland region’s business community and 
political leaders had become too reliant on “Santa’s sacks.” 

Peter Taylor, The Secret Peacemaker (BBC2, United Kingdom: 26 March 2008). 

Wilsey, 158. 

Kevin King, Words Over War - Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, ed. 
Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness (Maryland: Rowman & 
Eittlefield, 2000), 206. 

Colonel (Retd) Michael Crawshaw, “The Evolution of British COIN". Joint Doctrine 
Publication 3-40: 19. 

Brian A. Jackson, “Countering Intelligence in a ‘Eong War’ - The British Experience in 
Northern Ireland,” Military Review (January-February 2007): 75. 

Preventing violence in the first instance should be via a policy of prevention, mastery of 
terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, minimum force, rule of law, controlling territory and 
a denial of the emotional factors terrorism feeds off. 

Op BANNER, 8-15. 

Edwards, 14. 

^"Wilsey, 123. 

The concessions made by unionists at the Belfast Agreement were immediate and apparent, 
early release of prisoners, admission of Sinn Fein into the Assembly, north-south institutions and 
reform of the RUC. In contrast concessions made by Republicans, were theoretical and deferred. 
This was the principle of consent and revision of the Irish constitution. 


Jonathan Tonge, ""Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, ” (Harlow, United Kingdom: 

Pearson Edueation Limited, 2002), 213. 

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10. 

HM Government, ""A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty - The National Security 
Strategy, ” (October, 2010), 29. 

The United Kingdom is ranked only 26* out of 153 countries in the Global Peace Index (GPI), 
which is produced annually. The GPI provides an annual ranking of the countries of the world in 
terms of their proximity to peace, and stresses its relevance to global capital. 

HM Government, ""Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty - The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review, ” (October, 2010), 42. 

HM Government, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism, ” (The 
Stationary Office: July, 2011), 26. 

Paul Nolan, ""Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report - Number One,” (Belfast, Community 
Relations Council: February, 2012), 43. 

Dissident Republican strategy (Real IRA, Continuity IRA & Oglaigh na hEireann (OnH)) is 
threefold: (1) Dissident Republicans completely reject any negotiation with the British 
government on the issue of Northern Ireland, (2) Dissident Republicans view the Belfast 
Agreement as a capitulation, viewed at constraining the Republican movement, and take a zero- 
sum approach to Irish unification, (3) Dissident Republicans seek the dissolution of the Northern 
Irish Assembly and reject any cross-community arrangements. 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Broken Peace, Violence Returns to Northern Ireland, ”, November 2011, 8 - 13, 10. 

The 108-member Stormont Assembly does not have any dissident representatives, and neither 
does the 166-seat Irish Parliament. All the key institutions in Irish society are vehemently 
opposed to the dissidents, including the Catholic Church and the Gaelic Athletic Association 
(GAA). Given this, it is difficult to see how support for the dissidents is going to grow radically; 
at the same time, it is hard to imagine the threat going away. 

Jocelyn Evans, and Jonathon Tonge, “Menace without mandate? Is there any sympathy for 
‘Dissident’Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 
24:1,2012), 76. 

As Paul Nolan describes in the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, these are from areas 
of high social disadvantage with a prevalence of anti-social behavior. This has created a market 
of opportunity for the recruitment of individuals who wish to present themselves as ‘community 

Roger MacGinty, 161. 

Tongue, Jonathon, “They haven’t gone away you know. Irish Republican Dissidents and 
Armed Struggle, ” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 16:3, 2004), 690. 

Common forms of criminality could include drug-dealing, smuggling, drink-driving, fuel¬ 
laundering, petty criminality, fraud, counter-feit. 

While the Patten target of 30% has been reached for police officers, only 27.3% of all PSNI 
personnel are Catholic, as against estimates of 46% for the adult population. 

Vincent Kearney, “Temporary staff was seen a ‘short-term fix’, former senior police say,”, 30 January 2012, (accessed 
06 April 2012). 

Of the 304 rehired officers the breakdown is as follows: 63 in Intelligence Branch, 59 in serious 
crime and terrorism, 19 in Specialist Operations. 

O’Neill, P, “IRA Statement on Putting Arms Beyond Use,” statement released to the BBC 
News Channel on 26* September 2005. 

David Cameron. Bloody Sunday report published in the House of Commons. 15 June 2010. 


The opportunity for reasoned discussion about how the past should be handled was lost in the 
furore surrounding the 2009 report of the Consultative Group on the Past - largely because of a 
clause which suggested a one-off payment to all families who had lost someone in ‘the Troubles,’ 
regardless of whether that person was seen as a victim or a perpetrator. 

® Her Majesty’s Treasury in March 2011 stated, “Peace has not in itself been sufficient to raise 
Northern Ireland prosperity to the UK average. Northern Ireland still has one of the weakest 
economies in the UK.” 

Nolan, 32. 

Department of Finance and Personnel, “Northern Ireland Index of Production - Quarter 2 
2011”, October 12, 2011, q2 2011 statistical bulletin 2.pdf . accessed 06 April 2012. 

“ Nolan, 32. 

Sir David Richards, Address at RUSI by the Chief of Defence Staff, 
http://www.rusi.Org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/. December 12, 2011. 

Some nationalists continue to press for more progress in the area of human rights and equality, 
arguing in particular that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights and an Irish Eanguage 

® MacGinty & Darby, 127. 

™ Nolan, 134. 

The Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border 
Region of Ireland takes in the counties of Cavan, Donegal, Eeitrim, Eouth, Monaghan, and Sligo. 

Mark Devenport, “Is a new tranche of peace money on the cards for NI,”, June 27, 
2011, CO. uk/news/uk-northem-Ireland-13925081 (accessed 06 April 2012). 

Wilsey, 139. 

Nama was set up by the Irish government as part of the response to the country's banking and 
property crisis. Its role is to buy and then manage property loans, which had been made by the 
Dublin-based banks. The main reason given for setting up Nama is that it would take an 
enormous weight of bad loans from the banks and allow them to increase lending to viable 

Jim Fitzpatrick, “Nama’s impact on Northern Ireland property market,”, 28 July 
2011, (accessed 06 April 2012). 

The British Banking Association, in its search to inspire confidence in the Northern Ireland 
banking sector, has called for a Nama-style ha nk in Northern Ireland. 

Southern Ireland is part of the single currency, compared to Northern Ireland, which still holds 
the British pound. Significant differences include company/ corporate tax, which is 12.5% in 
southern Ireland in spite of the country’s economic bailout and 28% in the UK and Northern 
Ireland. Business commentators state that this is sifting inward investment. If the tax is brought 
into line with the south, it could invigorate the economy and for Stormont to control it rather than 
the UK Exchequer. 

MacGinty & Darby, 134. 

Northern Ireland Executive, “Economic Strategy - Priorities for sustainable growth and 
prosperity,” (November, 2011), 5. 

This analysis had been supported recently (Febmary 24, 2012), by Jim Fitzpatrick, the Business 
and Economics editor of BBC Northern Ireland. He stated, “Northern Ireland is suffering a 
“democratic overload” and needs a reworking of government that prioritizes the economy over 
the peace process,”, 
accessed 06 April 2012. 

As Bob Ainsworth (then Secretary of State for Defense) stated on 11 May 2009 as an answer to 
parliamentary questions, “There are regular Security Policy Meetings (SPM), chaired by 


Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which discuss security arrangements in Northern Ireland” l/text/9051 lw0028.htm. 

A distinction should be drawn early on between figures for arrest, charge and conviction. 
Figures for arrest can appear very high, however that will not equate to convictions. Section 41 of 
the Terrorism Act, allow the police to arrest anyone they suspect of being involved in terrorism, 
these suspicions may later be proven unfounded. Even those charged with terrorist offences may 
have charges amended or dropped at a later stage. On 13 May 09 the Home Office Published: 
Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain 11 September 2001 to 31 Mar 2008 
(it does not include Northern Ireland). The report provided a full statistical breakdown of arrests, 
charges convictions and sentences and showed a conviction rate of 13% of which only just over 
half were eventually convicted for the offences charged or like offences. Horgan & Morrison, 
2011, calculated that for Northern Ireland, of 641 individuals involved in dissident activity, 181 
were classified as convicted: that is, a confirmed conviction for illegal activity in the context of 
involvement in a dissident Republican movement (that is 28%). Most of these have been from 
RIRA and CIRA affiliation. From the PSNI statistics for 2011 under Section 41 of the Terrorism 
Act alone it is 21 %. 

Procedure in NI is broadly similar to that in England and Wales however there is a fundamental 
difference at the committal stage. In Northern Ireland a Magistrate first assesses the case. If there 
is a case to answer it is then referred to the Crown Court or it is dismissed. The defense can call 
witnesses at the committal stage and test the strength of the case and credibility of witnesses. 

This is a critical failing for terrorism cases, especially where there is a delicate balance of 
protecting information and capabilities in the interests of National Security. 

This was recognized as early as May 2000 in a joint letter developed by the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahem. They publicly pledged “to take 
measures that facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community, and to address related 

Over the next four years, 34 UK (including NI) terrorist-related prisoners will reach their 
release dates. It is vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their 
subsequent supervision manages the risks they may pose. There must be a continuing joint 
activity between the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), the police and other 
agencies to ensure that risk is effectively managed. Terrorist and terrorism-related offenders must 
continue to be subjected to Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), a statutory 
set of arrangements in which the police, prison and probation services are required to work 
together to assess and manage high risk offenders. As of Febmary 2011 there were 36 terrorist 
offenders managed under MAPPA across the UK. 

As Paul Nolan in the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, “while the Northern Ireland 
Executive has pledged in its draft Program for Government 2011 -15 to bring forward a new draft 
of Cohesion, Sharing and Integration, it is not expected that there will be a resource commitment 
that will match that which Northern Ireland has enjoyed from European and American funders.” 

James Dingley, “Northern Ireland and the Troubles,” Combatting Terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, ed.James Dingley (New York, United States: Routledge, 2009), 30. 

Wilsey, 175. 

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10. 

Wilsey, ix. 

Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland,, (Army Code 
71842, July 2006). accessed 06 April 2012. 

Edwards, 18. 


Baron Hunt, Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office (HMSO), United Kingdom: 3 October 1969). 

Edwards, 43. 

CAIN Web Service, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1-2 November 1986,, accessed 06 April 2012. 

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10. 

Edwards, 17. 

Wilsey, 107. 

'“Wilsey, 149. 

Wilsey, 122. 

Tonge, 196. 

CAIN Web Service, The Patten Report on Policing: Summary of Recommendations, . accessed 06 April 2012. 

MacGinty & Darby, xv. 

Wilsey, 42. 

Some commentators suggest that the Belfast Agreement in 1998 was the Sunningdale 
Initiative “for dummies!” 

Aughey, 55. 

Cox, Guelke, Stephen, ed., “A farewell to arms? From ‘long war’ to long peace in Northern 
Ireland,” (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2000), Appendix 10. 
Fisher & Ury, 86. 

HM Government, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism, ” 
(The Stationary Office: July, 2011), 27. 

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ” related incidents cy.pdf , (accessed 06 April 2012). 

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ” cy.pdf. (accessed 06 
April 2012). 

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ” cy.pdf, (accessed 06 
April 2012). 

Northern Ireland Office, “Northern Ireland Terrorism Eegislation: Annual Statistics 
2009/2010,” Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, ireland terrorism legislation annual statistics 2009-2010.pdf, 

accessed 06 April 2012. 

John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, “Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident 
Republicanism in Northern Ireland. ” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 23:4 ,2011), 646. 
John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, 651. 

Horgan, 647. 

Horgan, 649. 

Belfast Telegraph, “Dissidents pose less of a threat as splits widen, ”, 
January 3, 2012, 
of-a-threat-as-splits-widen-16098050.html, (accessed 06 April 2012). 

CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton - An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, Summarv.html. accessed 06 April 2012. 

CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton - An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland - 14 
July 1969 - 31 December 2001, Summarv.html, 
accessed 06 April 2012. 

M. F. R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland - The Military Strategy for the Irish Republican 
Movement (New York, United States: Routledge, 1995), 1. 

Edwards, 40. 


‘^^Wilsey, 111. 

Wilsey, 112. 

Jonathon Evans, “The Threat to National Security,” Address at the Worshipful Company of 
Security Professionals by the Director General of the Security Service, 16 September 2010. 
MacGinty & Darby, 22. 

MacGinty & Darby, 23. 

Toby Hamden, “Libyan arms helped the IRA to wage war,” The Telegraph, April 04, 2011, 
to-wage-war.html (accessed 06 April 2012). 

The IRA targeted Downing Street, London Stock Exchange and Heathrow in between the 
1994 and 1996 ceasefires. 

Edwards, 71. 

Edwards, 72. 

Nolan, 16. 

Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland - Beyond the Belfast Agreement (Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Routledge, 2005), 57. 

Edwards, 15. 

'^'’Edwards, 19. 

Taylor, Loyalists. 

Sir John Stevens, ''Stevens Enquiry 3 - Overview & Recommendations, ” ireland/03/stephens inquiry/pdf/stephens inquiry. 

pdf released on April 17, 2003. 

MacGinty & Darby, 24. 

'^“Wilsey, 130. 

Aughey, 55. 

Fisher & Ury, 5. 

Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland,, (Army Code 
71842, July 2006). 

Edwards, 34. 

Wilsey, 50. 

Wilsey, 87. 

Wilsey, 104. 

Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2002). 

Operation BANNER, 5-14. 

Edwards, 86. 

Taylor, The Brits. 

Taylor, The Brits.